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DISARRAY AMONG THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS:
HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW OF RULE 11 VIOLATIONS
Brent E. Newton*
In early 1998, in Brownsville, Texas, Rodolfo Vasquez-
Bernal was arrested and charged with violating 8 U.S.C. §
1326(a), an immigration statute that makes it a felony for a
previously deported alien to return to the United States without
the permission of the government.' Although a simple violation
of the statute only carries a two-year maximum prison sentence,
an alien who illegally reenters this country and whose previous
deportation followed his conviction for a felony faces a statutory
2maximum prison sentence of twenty years.
Vasquez, a Mexican citizen who dropped out of school
after the fourth grade, appeared in federal district court in
Brownsville and entered a plea of guilty to the indictment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure IL.3 The district
* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Houston, Texas. J.D., Columbia Law School;
B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. See Volume 1, District Court Record at 22, United States v. Vasquez-Bernal (S.D.
Tex.) (Cr. No. B-98-40).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1999). Subsection (b) provides that the maximum punishment
is twenty years for defendants previously convicted of enumerated "aggravated" felonies
(including drug-trafficking and violent offenses) and ten years for defendants previously
convicted of non-aggravated felonies. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43) & 1326(b)(1), (2). The
corresponding punishment ranges in the United States Sentencing Guidelines also vary
depending on a defendant's prior criminal record. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2L1.2 (1998).
3. Volume 1, District Court Record at 2, Vasquez-Bernal (Cr. No. B-98-40). Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part:
(c) Advice to defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere,
the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the
defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory
minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible
penalty provided by law, including the effect of any special parole or
supervised release term, the fact that the court is required to consider any
applicable sentencing guidelines but may depart from those guidelines
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 2000)
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
under some circumstances, and, when applicable, that the court may also
order the defendant to make restitution to any victim of the offense; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that the defendant
has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the
proceeding and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent the
defendant; and
(3) that the defendant has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that
plea if it has already been made, the right to be tried by a jury and at that
trial the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right against compelled
self-incrimination; and
(4) that if a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted by the court there
will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo
contendere the defendant waives the right to a trial; and
(5) if the court intends to question the defendant under oath, on the record,
and in the presence of counsel about the offense to which the defendant has
pleaded, that the defendant's answers may later be used against the
defendant in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
(d) Insuring that the plea is voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open
court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats
or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to
whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results
from prior discussions between the attorney for the government and the
defendant or the defendant's attorney.
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure.
(1) In general. The attorney for the government and the attorney for the
defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions
with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related
offense, the attorney for the government will do any of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's
request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such
recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the
case. The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
(2) Notice of such agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by the
parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the
agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the
time the plea is offered. If the agreement is of the type specified in
subdivision (e)(l)(A) or (C), the court may accept or reject the agreement,
or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has
been an opportunity to consider the presentence report. If the agreement is
of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the
defendant that if the court does not accept the recommendation or request
the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw the plea.
(3) Acceptance of a plea agreement. If the court accepts the plea
agreement, the court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the
judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement.
(4) Rejection of plea agreement. If the court rejects the plea agreement, the
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judge conducted Vasquez's rule 11 proceeding at the same time
that the court conducted the rule 11 proceedings of ten other
defendants charged with various other criminal offenses that
carried different penalty ranges from 8 U.S.C. § 1326 . At the
joint rule 11 hearing, the district court entirely failed to warn
Vasquez that he was facing a maximum sentence of up to twenty
years in prison.' The district court subsequently sentenced
Vasquez to forty-six months in federal prison.
Vasquez appealed his conviction to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In his appellate brief, Mr.
Vasquez challenged his conviction on the ground that he had not
been advised of the range of punishment at his guilty plea
proceeding in clear violation of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(c)(1).7 In its responsive brief, the Government
court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the
defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in
camera, that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the
defendant the opportunity to then withdraw the plea, and advise the
defendant that if the defendant persists in a guilty plea or plea of nolo
contendere the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the
defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement ....
(f) Determining accuracy of plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of
guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making
such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.
(g) Record of proceedings. A verbatim record of the proceedings at which the
defendant enters a plea shall be made and, if there is a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the record shall include, without limitation, the court's advice to the
defendant, the inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea including any plea
agreement, and the inquiry into the accuracy of a guilty plea.
(h) Harmless error. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
FED. R. CRIM. P. I1 (c)-(h).
4. Volume 2, District Court Record at 1, Vasquez-Bernal (Cr. No. B-98-40). The
"mass plea" procedure employed by the district court was formerly commonplace in
federal criminal cases, but gave way to individual rule 11 proceedings in the 1970s after
being strongly criticized. United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Goldberg, J.) (" We have banished from our jurisprudence the days when defendants were
lined up and the guilty pleas were taken in wholesale lots without individualization....
Even a plea taking session should have more dignity than a bargain basement sale at a
department store."). The "mass plea" procedure has again become commonplace in many
district courts in Texas, where federal district courts are "sinking in the floodtide of
[immigration-related] cases." United States v. Vasquez-Bernal, 197 F.3d 169, 171 (5th Cir.
1999) (Walter & Wiener, JJ., concurring).
5. Volume 2, District Court Record at 21-29, Vasquez-Bernal (Cr. No. B-98-40).
6. Volume 3, District Court Record at 7, Vasquez-Bernal (Cr. No. B-98-40).
7. See Appellant's Brief at 7-8, United States v. Vasquez-Bemal (5th Cir. 1999) (No.
98-40553); see also Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 6-14, Vasquez-Bernal (No. 98-
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"concede[d], as it must, that there is nothing in th[e] [district
court] record to reflect that Vasquez was informed by the court
prior to pleading guilty that he faced a maximum punishment of
20 years['] imprisonment."'  However, the Government
contended that the error was harmless under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 (h).9
After initially dismissing Vasquez's direct appeal as
"frivolous" in an unpublished opinion,'0 the Fifth Circuit oh
November 29, 1999, issued a revised opinion that concluded that
the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
1 (c)(1)-by failing to warn Vasquez of the statutory range of
punishment before accepting his plea of guilty-but held that
the district court's error was harmless." Although nothing in the
record showed that Vasquez knew the statutory range of
punishment when he pleaded guilty, the court reasoned that the
error was nevertheless harmless because:
Vasquez-Bernal does not argue that he would not have
pled guilty had he been personally informed of the
punishment range for his crime; he merely argues that the
court's error mandates a reversal of his conviction....
Vasquez-Bemal has offered no proof-not even an
allegation-that the punishment information omitted from
his plea hearing would have altered his plea to the illegal
entry charge.... Lacking such proof and finding no
rational basis under the circumstances to conclude that
Vasquez- Bernal would have pled differently had he been
properly advised of the punishment range for his offense,
we find no merit in appellant's argument.
Vasquez-Bernal's petition for a writ of certiorari
subsequently was denied by the United States Supreme Court. 3
40553).
8. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 11, Vasquez-Bernal (No. 98-40553).
9. Id. at 12.
10. United States v. Vasquez-Bernal, No. 98-40553, 192 F.3d 126 (5th Cir. Aug. 5,
1999) (table case).
11. United States v. Vasquez-Bemal, 197 F.3d 169, 170 (5th Cir. 1999).
12. Id. at 171 (citations omitted).
13. Vasquez-Berna v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 966 (2000).
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As discussed below, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly applied rule 11 (h)'s harmless
error standard to rule 11 errors in a manner that is contrary to
numerous decisions of both the Supreme Court and other United
States Courts of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit is not the only circuit
to erroneously apply rule 1(h), although Vasquez-Bernal
presents perhaps the most flagrant misapplication of the rule by
a lower court.
A. The Supreme Court's Guilty Plea Jurisprudence
In 1969, in two landmark cases, Boykin v. Alabama 4 and
McCarthy v. United States,5 the Supreme Court dramatically
altered the prevailing procedures applicable to trial courts'
taking of guilty pleas, particularly in the federal system. In
Boykin, the Court held that, in order for a criminal defendant's
plea of guilty to pass constitutional muster on appeal, the record
of the district court proceedings must disclose that the plea was
made in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner. 6 The
Court stated that the Constitution "demands the utmost
solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter
with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of
what the plea [of guilty] connotes," including an explanation of
"the nature of the charges," and a warning of the
"consequences" of a guilty plea.17 Such "consequences," the
Court noted, would include the applicable "range of sentences"
corresponding to the charge or charges." Because the record in
Boykin did not disclose a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
guilty plea, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction.' 9 In a
subsequent case discussing Boykin, the Court held that when a
14. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
15. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
16. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244.
17. Id. at 243-44 & n.7. The following year in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970), the Court repeated that a defendant does not voluntarily enter a plea of guilty
unless he is "'fully aware of the direct consequences"' of the plea. Id. at 755 (citation
omitted).
18. Id. at 244 n.7.
19. Id. at 244.
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defendant challenges his guilty plea on direct appeal and the
record does not "affirmatively show" that Boykin's commands
were complied with by the trial court, there is a "presumption"
that the plea is constitutionally invalid. °
In McCarthy, the Court addressed a federal district judge's
failure to comply with the requirements of rule 11. Although the
Court was applying rule 11 rather than addressing a
constitutional challenge to a guilty plea conviction (as in
Boykin), the Court nevertheless noted that rule 11 has
constitutional implications because the procedures required by
the rule are intended to assure that a defendant's plea is
constitutionally valid." The Court held that the district judge's
acceptance of the defendant's plea without compliance with rule
SlI's requirements requires automatic reversal of the defendant's
conviction.22 The Court held that such an automatic reversal was
an appropriate remedy because it cannot be "assumed" that a
defendant entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty
plea when the district court's failure to comply with rule 11
resulted in a silent record regarding the defendant's knowledge
of the information required by rule 1 1.23 That is, just as in
Boykin, the Court in McCarthy presumed based on a silent
record that a defendant lacked the requisite information to enter
a valid guilty plea. In that regard, the Court forbade
"speculation" by an appellate court about what a defendant
actually knew when the record was silent.24
In two subsequent cases, the Court limited the reach of
Boykin and McCarthy by holding that such a presumption of an
invalid plea based on a silent record was appropriate only on
direct appeal and not on habeas corpus or "collateral" review.25
On collateral review, a defendant has the burden to show that a
district court's violation of the procedural requirements of
20. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992).
21. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466.
22. Id. at 469.
23. Id. at 464-65, 467.
24. Id. at 471.
25. See Parke, 506 U.S. at 29 (Boykin's presumption is inapplicable to collateral
challenges to guilty pleas); United States v. Timmreck,.441 U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979)
(McCarthy's rule of automatic reversal is inapplicable to collateral challenges to guilty
pleas).
DISARRAY AMONG THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS
Boykin or rule 11 actually prejudiced the defendant in a manner
that rendered his guilty plea invalid. 6
B. Rule 11(h)'s History and Purpose
In 1983, rule 11 was amended by the addition of subsection
(h), which provides:
(h) Harmless Error. Any variance from the procedures
required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded.
27
The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules" state that,
"[s]ubdivision (h) makes clear that the harmless error rule of
[Fed. R. Crim. P.] 52(a) is applicable to Rule 1 l. ' 29 The
Committee stated that a more precise definition of what is
harmless error in this context "is left to the caselaw."30 The clear
purpose of subsection (h) was to modify McCarthy's rule of
automatic reversal for any and all rule 11 violations. According
to the Advisory Committee, appellate courts should find
harmless "minor or technical" violations of rule 11, violations
26. Parke, 506 U.S. at 29; Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 783-84. Another noteworthy
Supreme Court decision is Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976). In Henderson, the
Court addressed a defendant's challenge to his guilty plea on the ground that he was
unaware of the nature of the charge, including the elements of the offense, during the plea
hearing. Id. at 643-44; cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(c)(1) (district court must explain to a
defendant "the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered"). The Court recognized
that a defendant's ignorance of the nature of the charge rendered his guilty plea involuntary
"in a constitutional sense" under the Due Process Clause. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 644-45.
Significantly, in addressing the prosecution's harmless error arguments, the Court held that
the error was not harmless even if it was clear that the defendant "probably would have
pleaded guilty anyway" had he known the nature of the charge. Id. at 644 n.12. Similarly,
the Court rejected the argument that the error was harmless in view of the "overwhelming
evidence of guilt available." Id. at 644.
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (h).
28. In interpreting rule 11, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the
Advisory Committee Notes. See, e.g., United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676 (1997).
The Notes are, in effect, the legislative history equivalent of a conference committee report
accompanying a piece of legislation.
29. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee notes; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)
("Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded.").
30. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee notes. "This amendment has been
criticized for failing to adequately define harmless error." United States v. McGeehan, 824
F.2d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 1987).
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which "could not have had any impact on the defendant's
decision to plead [guilty]." 3
The Advisory Committee, however, added the following
important caveat to its new harmless error rule:
[T]he Advisory Committee does wish to emphasize two
important cautionary notes. The first is that subdivision (h)
should not be read as supporting extreme or speculative
harmless error claims or as, in effect, nullifying important
Rule 11 safeguards. There would not be harmless error
under subdivision (h) where, for example, as in McCarthy,
there had been absolutely no inquiry by the judge into
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge and
the harmless error claim of the government rests upon
nothing more than the assertion that it may be "assumed"
[the] defendant possessed such understanding merely
because he expressed a desire to plead guilty. ... Indeed, it
is fair to say that the kinds of Rule 11 violations which
might be found to constitute harmless error upon direct
appeal are fairly limited ....
The second cautionary note is that subdivision (h) should
not be read as an invitation to trial judges to take a more
casual approach to Rule 11 proceedings.... Subdivision
(h) makes no change in the responsibilities of the judge at
Rule 11 proceedings, but instead merely rejects the extreme
sanction of automatic reversal.32
C. The U.S. Courts of Appeals' Conflicting
Applications of Rule 11(h)
Since 1983, every United States Court of Appeals has
applied rule 11 (h) to various rule 11 violations by district courts
at guilty plea proceedings. As discussed below, the "voluminous
jurisprudence" regarding rule 11(h)33 has resulted in vast
disarray among the lower federal courts.34 The clear majority of
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. United States v. Johnson, 1 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
34. Within five years of rule I1 (h)'s promulgation, numerous circuits already were
divided on its proper application. See United States v. Bernal, 861 F.2d 434, 436 (5th Cir.
1988) (discussing the conflicting approaches of numerous circuits regarding rule 1 l(h)). As
discussed infra, that division has only grown over the following decade.
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appellate decisions have applied rule 11 (h) in direct appeal cases
in a manner faithful to the foregoing Advisory Committee Notes
and the Supreme Court's decisions in McCarthy, Boykin, and
their progeny. For instance, in applying the harmless error
standard, the Second Circuit has "adopted a standard of strict
adherence to Rule 11" and warned district judges that "on direct
appeal there will be little room for minimizing the effect of a
failure to comply with Rule 11." " The Fifth Circuit has been on
the opposite end of the spectrum, at least since its unanimous en
banc decision in 1993 in United States v. Johnson,36 which
abrogated the Fifth Circuit's previous, less forgiving approach to
rule 11 (h) harmless error analysis.37
The most significant inter-circuit split regarding rule 11 (h)
concerns the issue of which party on direct appeal has the
burden of persuasion under rule 11(h), the criminal defendant or
the United States. As evidenced by the Fifth Circuit's recent
decision in Vasquez-Bernal and numerous other decisions by
that court on direct appeal since rule 11 (h) was promulgated in
1983, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly placed the burden on the
criminal defendant to establish harm or prejudice resulting from
the district court's rule 11 violation. In effect, the Fifth Circuit
has applied the Supreme Court's approach in Timmreck-which
involved a collateral attack on a guilty plea-to rule 11 claims
raised on direct appeal.3"
In Vasquez-Bernal, the Fifth Circuit held that the rule
11 (c)(1) error was harmless because the defendant "has offered
35. See, e.g., United.States v. Livorsi, 180 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Ferrara, 954 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir.
1992) (same).
36. United States v. Johnson, 1 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
37. Id. at 301-02. Prior to Johnson, the Fifth Circuit repeatedly held that a district
court's failure to comply with certain provisions of Fed. R. Crim. P. 1 -" core concern"
provisions, including rule 1 l(c)(l)-automatically required reversal on direct appeal. See,
e.g., United States v. Pierce, 893 F.2d 669, 678-79 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kahn,
588 F.2d 964, 964 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Government of Canal Zone v. Tobar T.,
565 F.2d 1321, 1321 (5th Cir. 1978).
38. See United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979) (in rejecting the
defendant's rule 11 claim, the Court stated that the defendant "does not argue that he was
actually unaware of the [applicable sentence] or that, if he had been properly advised by
the trial judge, he would not have pleaded guilty"). In this regard, the Fifth Circuit has
failed to appreciate the line between direct review and collateral review that the Supreme
Court itself drew in Timmreck, id. at 783-84.
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no proof-not even an allegation-that the punishment
information omitted from his plea hearing would have altered
his plea to the illegal reentry charge."3 9 Vasquez-Bernal was the
latest in a line of Fifth Circuit cases on direct appeal squarely
placing the burden of persuasion under rule 11(h) on a
defendant. 4°
The Fifth Circuit's cases holding that, when the appellate
record is silent, a defendant on direct appeal has the burden to
show actual prejudice are in conflict with numerous other
circuits, which on direct appeal place the burden on the
prosecution to show that the defendant was not harmed or
prejudiced by the rule 11 violation. 4' The Ninth Circuit explicitly
disagrees with the Fifth Circuit's approach:
We suggest, respectfully, that such an approach
misconstrues the harmless error principle of Rule 11(h).
39. United States v. Vasquez-Bernal, 197 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1999).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 184 F.3d 415, 417 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding
violations of rule I I(c)(1) harmless because "Smith does not maintain that she did not
understand the charges at the time she pled guilty.. .[;] [rather,] she contends that the
district court failed to personally ensure that she understood the charges"); id. at 417
(finding rule 1 l(d) error harmless because "Smith has not shown that the district court's
failure to question her about the voluntariness of her plea affected her substantial rights"
insofar as "[s]he does not contend that she actually pled guilty as a result of force, threats,
or promises"); United States v. Francisco Mendoza-Mora, No. 98-20060, unpublished slip
op., at 2 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1998) ("Mendoza does not state that his plea was the product of
threats or force or that he would have pled differently had a proper Rule 11 colloquy taken
place."), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 915 (1999); United States v. Williams, 120 F.3d 575, 577-
78 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding rule 1 l(c)(1) error harmless because "Williams does not claim
that he would have pled differently had he been informed of the applicable [statutory]
maximum [punishment]"), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1061 (1998); United States v.
Thibodeaux, 811 F.2d 847, 848 (5th Cir. 1987) (in finding the district court's rule I l(e)(2)
error harmless, the court stated: "Thibodeaux does not contend that he was under the
impression that he could withdraw his plea if the judge did not follow the government's
[sentencing] recommendation. Nor does he allege that he would have withdrawn his plea
had the district judge given the Rule I l(e)(2) warning").
41. The Fifth Circuit's holding that a defendant seeking reversal under rule 11 has the
burden to at least allege on direct appeal that he did not know of the relevant information
and would not have pleaded guilty but for the rule 11 violation, see United States v.
Vasquez-Bernal, 197 F.3d 169, 171 (5th Cir. 1999), contradicts the well-established rule
that factual allegations de hors the record will not be considered on direct appeal. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hay, 685 F.2d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[O]n a direct appeal of a
conviction based upon a plea, complaints based upon facts outside the record are not before
and will not be considered by the reviewing court.") (citing cases); see also FED. R. CRiM.
P. I 1(h) advisory committee notes (harmless error analysis "must be resolved solely on the
basis of the Rule 11 transcript and other portions . .. of the limited record made in such
cases" ).
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[The Fifth Circuit's approach] would effectively require the
defendant to meet the burden of proving a negative-to
show that he in fact did not understand the omitted Rule 11
advisement. We have no doubt that the Rule 11 harmless
error clause imposes no such burden on the defendant....
[Rule 1 1 (h)] requires an affirmative showing on the record
that the defendant was actually aware of the advisement,
not a showing by the defendant that he was unaware of the
omitted advisement.42
The conflict between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits has
spread over the years to other circuits as well. In addition to the
Fifth Circuit, the First and Third Circuits have placed the burden
of persuasion under rule 11 (h) on the defendant rather than the
United States on direct appeal. 3
However, in addition to the Ninth Circuit in Graibe, 44other
circuits have placed the burden under rule 1 1(h)45  on the
42. United States v. Graibe, 946 F.2d 1428, 1433-34 (9th Cir. 1991) (criticizing the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Thibodeaux).
43. The Ninth Circuit in Graibe noted that the Third Circuit had taken the same
harmless error approach as the Fifth Circuit. See Graibe, 946 F.2d at 1434 (citing United
States v. de le Puente, 755 F.2d 313, 315 (3d Cir. 1985)). The First Circuit also has placed
the burden of persuasion on the defendant. See United States v. Ferguson, 60 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1995) ("Nor does Ferguson suggest that if the [district] court had [complied with Rule
1 (c)(1)], he would not have pled guilty."); see also United States v. Noriega-Millan, 110
F.3d 162, 167-68 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Thibodeax with approval); see generally United
States v. DeBusk, 976 F.2d 300, 305-06 (6th Cir. 1992) ("The courts of appeals are divided
on the proper approach to a harmless error argument in cases in where the district court
fails to follow the command of Rule 1 (e)(2)." ).
44. See also United States v. Odedo, 154 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[a]ny
deviation from the requirements of Rule 11 is reversible unless the government
demonstrates that [the error] was harmless"; "[iun the total absence of any reference [by
the district court] at the plea hearing to the charge or its nature, we can assume nothing
more than total ignorance of the charge on the part of [the defendant]") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Gastelum, 16 F.3d 996, 999-1000 (9th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 857 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1988)
(refusing to deem the district court's rule 1 l(c)(1) error harmless because "[i]t does not
appear from the record that Suarez knew the maximum sentence that could be imposed
before he entered his [guilty] plea"); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1385-86 &
n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (In finding that rule 11 (d) error was not harmless, the court reasoned:
"If it is elsewhere evidenced, a trial judge's failure to demonstrate on the Rule 11 transcript
that a defendant's plea was voluntary may be harmless error.... Here, however, we cannot
discern voluntariness from even the entire record."); cf. United States v. Cross, 57 F.3d
588, 590-91 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding a rule 11(d) error harmless where the
contemporaneous written plea agreement signed by the defendant stated that his decision to
plead guilty was not the result of force or threats).
45. Placing the burden on the Government rather than the defendant on direct appeal
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
prosecution to show, based solely on the record before the
appellate court, that a district court's failure to follow a
46provision of the rule was harmless. The Seventh Circuit has
gone so far as to hold that, when a district court violates rule 11,
"unless strong indications to the contrary are apparent from the
record a court should presume [the Rule 11 violation] influenced
a defendant's decision to plead guilty. ' 47 Like the Seventh
Circuit in Padilla, the Ninth Circuit has engaged in such a
"presumption" of prejudice to a defendant. 4' Although the
Fourth Circuit "ha[s] declined to go as far as the Seventh Circuit
in endorsing a presumption that a Rule 11 failure [by a district
comports with the Court's cases applying the harmless error doctrine in other criminal law
contexts. See, e.g., O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437-39 (1995) (burden on
prosecution to show lack of harm where constitutional violation is shown on federal habeas
corpus review); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (burden on prosecution
to show lack of harm under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) with respect to nonconstitutional error
raised on direct appeal in federal system); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)
(burden on prosecution to show constitutional error was harmless "beyond a reasonable
doubt" on direct appeal in federal or state systems). If a rule 1 I error rises to the level of a
constitutional violation-such as a district court's failure to explain the nature of the
charges or warn the defendant of the statutory range of punishment, see, e.g., Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)-then the Government's burden should be to establish that
the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" under Chapman. See Keel v. United
States, 585 F.2d 110, 116 n.13 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Rubin, J., concurring)
(" Obviously, if the Rule 11 transgression was serious as to amount to a deprivation of a
constitutional right, the Chapman test would be applicable.").
46. See, e.g., United States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 1998) (refusing to
deem the district court's rule I1 (c)(1) error harmless because "the record contains no
evidence [that the defendant] actually did know the elements [of the offense] or the
penalties"); United States v. Siegel, 102 F.3d 477, 482 (1 1th Cir. 1996) ("Contrary to the
government's contentions, the district court's failure to [follow] Rule 1 l[(c)(l)] was not
harmless, as there is no evidence in the record [of] the Rule 11 proceeding which
demonstrates that Siegel was aware of these maximum and mandatory minimum penalties
on these counts."); United States v. Dewalt, 92 F.3d 1209, 1213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("on
direct appeal the Government must show that a Rule 11 violation was harmless in order to
prevail" and "[a] district court's failure to comply with Rule 1 l(c)(l) is harmless if the
record reveals.., that the defendant had actual notice of the information that the district
judge failed to convey"); United States v. Hourihan, 936 F.2d 508, 511 (11th Cir. 1991)
(refusing to find Rule 1 (c)(1) error harmless because "there is no indication in the record
that Hourihan knew of the five-year minimum mandatory sentence"); United States v.
Young, 927 F.2d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Syal, 963 F.2d 900,
905 (6th Cir. 1992) (refusing to find a rule I l(c)(1) error harmless because "[i]t is not clear
[from the record] that Syal understood each element of the formal criminal charges").
47. United States v. Padilla, 23 F.3d 1220, 1222 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
48. Odedo, 154 F.3d at 940; United States v. Gutierrez, 1997 WL 409532, at *1 (9th
Cir. July 15, 1997) (citing Padilla).
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court] affects the defendant's decision to plead guilty, ' 49 the
Fourth Circuit nevertheless refused to deem a district court's
rule 11 (c)(1) error harmless because there was no "affirmative
indication in the record" that the defendant was actually aware
of all potential statutory penalties that he was facing when he
pleaded guilty.5°
When the record on appeal is silent regarding a rule 11
admonishment, at least with respect to the "core concerns" of
rule 1 l," such a presumption on direct appeal appears to be
required by the Supreme Court's decisions in Boykin and
Parke.52 A minority of circuits, led by the Fifth Circuit, actually
apply the opposite presumption by placing the burden on a
defendant to prove his lack of knowledge of the relevant rule 11
information Such a reverse presumption-requiring proof that
the defendant would not have pleaded guilty but for the district
court's rule 11 violation-also conflicts with the Supreme
Court's decision in Henderson v. Morgan, in which the Court
held that it was irrelevant whether the defendant would have
pleaded guilty notwithstanding the district court's error.4
D. Conclusion
Since rule 11 (h)'s promulgation in 1983, the United States
Courts of Appeals have applied rule 11(h) in hundreds, if not
49. United States v. Thorne, 153 F.3d 130, 133 (4th Cir. 1998). But cf United States v.
Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1993) ("prejudice to the defendant can be
presumed on direct appeal when the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that the
defendant's plea of guilt[y] was knowing") (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244), aff'd on other
grounds, 511 U.S. 485 (1994).
50. Thorne, 153 F.3d at 133-34; see also United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 403-04
(4th Cir. 1995) (although refusing to adopt Padilla's "presumption," nevertheless refusing
to find rule 1 l(c)(1) error harmless because "there is no evidence in the record that Goins
was aware that he was facing a mandatory minimum sentence of five years before his
plea").
51. The traditional "core concerns" of rule 11 are: "(1) whether the guilty plea was
coerced; (2) whether the defendant understands the nature of the charges; and (3) whether
the defendant understands the consequences of his plea." United States v. Johnson, I F.3d
296, 300 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
52. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43; Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Bemal, 197 F.3d 169, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Ferguson, 60 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. de le Puente, 755
F.2d 313, 315 (3d Cir. 1985)).
54. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); see supra note 26.
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thousands, of criminal cases in which defendants have sought to
vacate their guilty pleas based on district courts' violations of
rule 11 at guilty plea proceedings." However, the United States
Supreme Court has never addressed-or even cited-rule 11 (h),
although the Court's harmless error jurisprudence in other
criminal contexts has greatly developed during the past decade
or so.516 Inexplicably, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Vasquez-Bernal v. United States,57 even though Vasquez-
Bernal's petition for a writ of certiorari clearly called the Court's
attention to the division among the federal circuits.
Supreme Court rule 10(a) provides that a division among
the United States Courts of Appeals on a particular issue is a
traditional basis for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and
address the circuit-splitting issue. In view of the disarray among
the lower courts, the United States Supreme Court should grant
certiorari and address the proper application of rule 11 (h)'s
harmless error standard. In accord with the Advisory Committee
Notes and the Court's prior guilty plea jurisprudence, the Court
should overrule the minority of circuits that place the burden on
the defendant to show that, but for the rule 11 error, he would
not have pled guilty.
55. Rule 1 (h) has been cited over 300 times in federal cases reported on Westlaw. Of
course, the vast majority of criminal appeals today are resolved in unpublished opinions
that are not reported on Westlaw.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (addressing the application
of Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) & (b) to "trial errors" in criminal cases); Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619 (1993) (addressing the application of the harmless error standard to
constitutional claims of trial error raised on federal habeas corpus review).
57. 120 S. Ct. 966 (2000).
